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James M. Poterba and Mark J. Warshawsky 
One of the crucial questions about the operation of “individual accounts” 
systems of retirement saving is how participants will draw down their ac- 
count balances when  they reach retirement.  Most defined-contribution 
plans do not specify how accumulated assets will be drawn down. By  con- 
trast, most defined-benefit plans sponsored by private companies or by the 
government provide retirees with mandatory life annuities. Private pen- 
sion plans purchase these annuities as part of a group annuity contract 
with an insurance company or underwrite  the annuities themselves. In 
public pension plans such as social security, the government underwrites 
the annuities. 
Some, but not all, current  participants in defined-contribution plans 
wish to obtain life annuities. Roughly one-third of 401(k) plans and most 
403(b) plans currently offer participants a voluntary life annuity payout. 
The annuities purchased with funds from accounts in these pension plans 
are individual annuities purchased through the group plans. If an individ- 
ual participates in a pension plan that does not offer life annuities and 
nevertheless desires such a distribution method, it is necessary to purchase 
an individual life annuity through  an agent or a broker representing a 
commercial insurance company. The costs of such annuities, including 
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both administrative and sales costs, the “adverse-selection”  costs associ- 
ated with voluntary purchase behavior, and return on capital for the insur- 
ance company offering the annuity policy, affect the retirement income 
that the participant receives for a given level of wealth accumulation. 
Questions about the cost of annuitization also arise in discussions of 
individual account social security reform proposals. Under  the present 
social security system, the federal government provides life annuities to 
all retirees. Because these are compulsory annuities, the adverse-selection 
problems that may arise in private, voluntary annuity markets are not a 
concern. In  addition, the existing social security arrangement involves 
none of the sales or marketing costs that might be charged by  insurance 
companies that sell individual annuities, although there are some adminis- 
trative costs associated with the current social security system. 
Most proposals that suggest the use of individual accounts as a supple- 
ment to, or partial substitute for, the existing social security system would 
mandate some type of annuitization when the accountholder retires. This 
is true, for example, of the proposals advanced by the Committee on Eco- 
nomic Development, the CSIS (Center for Strategic and International 
Studies), and a subset of participants on the 1994-96  Social Security Ad- 
visory Council (“the IA proposal”). While the mandatory annuitization 
aspects of these proposals reduce concern about adverse selection, struc- 
turing annuity options to achieve equitable payouts, at low cost, is never- 
theless an important issue. 
Previous research on annuity markets provides only limited guidance 
on the potential operation of an annuity mechanism involving the pur- 
chase  of  individual  annuity  contracts  within  a  defined-contribution 
“group” system. Most existing research has focused on the very limited 
agent-dominated individual annuity market in the United States. Previous 
studies, including Warshawsky (1988), Friedman and Warshawsky (1  990), 
and Mitchell et al. (1999), have calculated the expected present discounted 
value of annuity payouts, relative to policy premiums, for individual annu- 
ity policies. Because the sales and administrative costs of current individ- 
ual annuity policies are likely to be  substantially greater than those of 
individual annuities provided in a group plan or a reformed social security 
system, existing calculations probably provide a lower bound on potential 
payouts in a system of “private accounts.” 
The PSA (personal security account) proposal put forward by  a subset 
of  the Social Security Advisory Council (see Gramlich 1996) would not 
mandate annuitization from individual social security accounts or create 
any group mechanism for providing life annuities. Rather, individuals who 
desired to convert their account accumulations to a life annuity would 
have to purchase an annuity from an insurance agent. Calculations of the 
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fore provide information that is likely to bear on an evaluation of the PSA 
proposal. It is possible, however, that administrative costs per policy and 
the degree of adverse selection in the market would change if wealth accu- 
mulation in individual accounts became universal. 
In this paper, we present new findings on the costs of individual annui- 
ties, both in the individual annuity market and in two large defined-contri- 
bution  pension  systems, the  federal government’s Thrift  Savings Plan 
(TSP) and TIAA-CREE While we do not assess directly the cost of annui- 
tization for any particular individual accounts social security system, we 
report background information that should be helpful in evaluating such 
costs. We  provide a detailed summary of the structures employed by the 
TSP and by  TIAA-CREF to offer individual annuities to their partici- 
pants. Our goal is to inform discussion of potential options and structures 
for providing annuities under individual account systems that might be 
considered as part of a social security reform plan. 
The paper is divided into four sections. Section 5.1 presents updated 
information on the expected present discounted value of annuity payouts 
in the market for individual single-premium-immediate annuities. These 
calculations draw on data for annuity premiums and payouts in June 1998 
and extend the analysis in Mitchell et al. (1999) to consider individual an- 
nuities purchased through agents and brokers as part of qualified retire- 
ment-saving plans (like IRAs) as well  as in  nonqualified accounts. The 
results in this section indicate that the present value of annuity payouts, 
relative to premium costs, has increased in recent years. 
Section 5.2 examines the annuity options that are available to individu- 
als who participate in the federal government’s TSP. This is a large, volun- 
tary, 401(k) plan that is available to federal employees. We present infor- 
mation on the structure of the “request for proposals” that the TSP issues 
when it solicits bids from private insurance companies that may wish to 
provide life annuities to TSP participants.  We  also present information 
on the payouts associated with individual annuities purchased through 
this plan. 
Section 5.3 describes the annuities offered by TIAA-CREF, which pro- 
vides basic and supplementary pension plans to the employees of universi- 
ties and other nonprofit educational and research institutions. TIAA an- 
nuities, which  include a nonguaranteed  element, offer payouts that  are 
among the highest in the individual annuity market owing to their supe- 
rior investment returns and low expenses. TIAA-CREF variable annuities 
offer payouts that reflect, on at least an annual basis, the investment expe- 
rience of various underlying equity, fixed-income, and real estate invest- 
ment portfolios. 
The conclusion provides a summary and suggests several topics related 
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5.1  Individual Annuities Offered through Agents 
by Commercial Insurance Companies 
With individual nonparticipating,  single-premium-immediate life  an- 
nuities offered by commercial life insurance companies, individuals make 
an initial premium payment and typically begin receiving annuity payouts 
in the month after their purchase. We focus on nonparticipating annuities, 
which provide a fixed and guaranteed benefit payment. 
Premiums for life annuities are reported each year in A. M. Best’s publi- 
cation Best? Review: Life and Health. We  analyze data from the August 
1998 issue, which presents the results of an annuity market survey carried 
out at the beginning of June 1998. The Best? data correspond to single- 
premium annuities with a $100,000 premium. Ninety-nine companies re- 
sponded to the survey, reporting information on the current monthly pay- 
outs on individual annuities sold to men and women at ages fifty-five, 
sixty, sixty-five, seventy, seventy-five, and eighty. Companies also reported 
their  payouts  for  similar  annuities  purchased  with  funds  in  qualified 
retirement-saving plans. Qualified annuities must begin payouts by  age 
seventy, so there are no data for qualified annuities that  start at ages 
seventy-five or eighty. Roughly two-thirds of the companies reported the 
same payout value for both the qualified and the nonqualified annuity, 
while one-third reported different values. Virtually all companies report- 
ing differences between qualified and nonqualified annuities at a given age 
reported the same qualified annuity payouts for men and women of the 
same age, reflecting their use of a “unisex” mortality table in pricing the 
qualified annuities, in contrast to gender-distinct pricing of nonqualified 
annuities. 
Table 5.1 provides summary information on the monthly annuity pay- 
outs associated with a representative set of annuity products. Each entry 
in the table shows the monthly payout per $100,000 of annuity premium. 
Because earlier research has documented wide dispersion in the annuity 
payouts offered by different companies, we  report both the average payout 
across companies and the average payout for the ten firms that offered the 
highest payout products. A sixty-five-year-old man purchasing a $100,000 
single-premium annuity would receive, on average, a monthly payment of 
$733, or $8,793 per year, for life. Because women live longer than men on 
average, a sixty-five-year-old woman paying the same $100,000 premium 
would receive about 10 percent less, $662 per month or $7,939 per year. 
These average payouts are roughly 8 percent lower than the payouts in the 
1995 Best’s survey, which provided the basis for the analysis in Mitchell et 
al. (1999). This presumably reflects the decline in interest rates since 1995. 
One important feature of  annuity prices, which is present in the June 
1998 data as well as in those for earlier dates, is the substantial variation 
in  the  payouts  offered by  different insurance  companies. The average Costs of Annuitizing Retirement Payouts from Individual Accounts  177 
Table 5.1  Monthly Payments ($) per $100,000 Premium for Annuities Available 
from Commercial Insurers in June 1998 
Average for Ten Policies with 
All-Policy Average  Highest Payouts 
Buyer  Qualified  Nonqualified  Qualified  Nonqualified 
Male, age 55  596.22  606.44  671.60  675.70 
Male, age 65  719.91  732.73  809.30  806.58 
Male, age 75  N.A.  988.84  N.A.  1,084.69 
Female, age 55  568.46  563.04  639.70  630.62 
Female, age 65  671.47  661.62  748.77  728.35 
Female, age 75  N.A.  857.69  N.A.  948.58 
Sources: Data are drawn from Besti Review: Life and Health (August 1998) and authors’ tab- 
ulations. 
Note: N.A. = not available. 
monthly payout for the ten companies with the highest payout for a sixty- 
five-year-old man, for example, is  $807, which is  10 percent higher than 
the average payout for all firms. There are similar differences in the prices 
offered to annuitants at other ages. In Mitchell et al. (1999), a variety of 
possible explanations for these payout differences were explored, such as 
apparent differential riskiness of different insurance companies, but  no 
systematic pattern in the payouts was found. (The companies offering the 
“ten highest-payout’’ annuities in table 5.1 generally are small and me- 
dium-size life insurers.) Payout differences across firms may reflect differ- 
ent  assumptions about mortality  rates, different rate-of-return  assump- 
tions  in  pricing  policies,  and  differences  in  administrative  costs  and 
expense ratios. The heterogeneity in annuity prices suggests that, if  indi- 
viduals were allowed to purchase their own annuity contracts in a system 
of “individual accounts,” different individuals might receive substantially 
different annuity benefits. 
Unfortunately, we  do not have data on the volume of annuities sold by 
different firms in the Best’s database, which would help judge the actual 
extent of payout dispersion in the annuitant population. In addition, such 
information would help determine whether the surveyed rates represent 
active lines of  business or are just used to bolster illustrations in sales 
materials for deferred annuities. The calculations presented below focus 
on cases in which individuals purchase annuities that offer the average 
payout. 
Table 5.1 presents information on nonqualified as well  as qualified an- 
nuities. For men, the average monthly payout on qualified annuities is be- 
low that on nonqualified annuities, as a result of the use of “unisex” mor- 
tality tables in pricing the qualified annuities offered by  some insurance 
companies, as mentioned above. For a sixty-five-year-old man, a qualified 178  James M. Poterba and Mark J. Warshawsky 
annuity offers payouts that average about 1.8 percent less than payouts on 
nonqualified annuities. For women, the pattern is reversed. The average 
payout from qualified annuities is greater than that from nonqualified an- 
nuities. For a sixty-five-year-old woman, qualified annuities offer an aver- 
age payout that is roughly 1.5 percent greater, each month, than the aver- 
age payout for nonqualified annuities. 
To provide insight on the administrative and other costs associated with 
individual annuity products, we compute the expected present discounted 
value (EPDV) of payouts for the average annuity product. We  compare 
this EPDV with the premium cost of the annuity. This yields a measure of 
the “money’s worth” of the individual annuity, as in Warshawsky (1988), 
Friedman and Warshawsky (1988, 1990), and Mitchell et al. (1999). 
The formula that we  use to calculate the EPDV of a nominal annuity 
with monthly payout A,  purchased by an individual of age b, is 
The upper limit  of  the summation,  12  X  (115 - b), is  the number  of 
months that a person of age b would live if he or she reached age 115. We 
assume that no one survives beyond this age. Pi  denotes the probability 
that an individual of age b years at the time of the annuity purchase sur- 
vives for at least j months beyond this purchase. 
The term  ik denotes the one-month interest rate k  months after the an- 
nuity purchase.  In our baseline calculations, we  measure these interest 
rates using the term structure of yields for zero-coupon Treasury “strips.” 
We estimate the pattern of monthly interest rates that is implied by these 
yields. The data on the zero-coupon yield curve are published each Thurs- 
day in the Wall Street Journal, and we  use the data from the first Thursday 
in June 1998 to coincide with the timing of Best? annuity-price data. This 
approach to measuring discount rates differs from that in previous studies 
of the EPDV of nominal annuities. Friedman and Warshawsky (1990) as- 
sumed a constant nominal discount rate for all periods. Mitchell et al. 
(1999) used a term structure of riskless government bond yields, but they 
did not use the yields on zero-coupon bonds to construct this yield curve. 
We used the zero-coupon yields because they seem the best available infor- 
mation on the discount rates for the present-value calculations. 
We  also consider a second set of  discount rates that correspond to a 
risky corporate bond. To construct these discount rates, we  measure the 
difference between the yield on a BAA corporate bond and that on a ten- 
year Treasury bond in early June 1998. This yield spread was  137 basis 
points. We  then add this “risk premium” to the entire term structure of 
riskless interest rates that we estimate from the Treasury yield curve. 
We evaluate equation (1) using two sets of projected survival probabili- Costs of Annuitizing Retirement Payouts from Individual Accounts  179 
ties. Projections are needed because P, describes the prospective survival 
experience of today’s annuity buyers. The first set of survival probabilities 
corresponds to the population at large. We use cohort-mortality-rate pro- 
jections developed by  Bell,  Wade, and Goss (1992) at the Office of  the 
Actuary of the Social Security Administration (SSA). One of the key dif- 
ficulties in evaluating the effective cost of purchasing an annuity, however, 
is that the pool of actual annuity purchasers has different mortality experi- 
ence than the population at large. There is “adverse selection” in this mar- 
ket; annuitants tend to have longer life expectancies than individuals in 
the broader population. From the standpoint of an insurance company 
writing annuities, the annuitant mortality table must be used to determine 
the relation between premium income and the EPDV of payouts. Adverse 
selection is a “cost” of annuitization from the perspective of an individual 
in the population at large. 
One important question about the potential effect of expanding individ- 
ual account retirement-saving vehicles is how this expansion would affect 
the degree of adverse selection in the annuity market. A universal system 
of individual accounts, coupled with mandatory annuitization, would re- 
duce adverse selection, although it would not eliminate it entirely because 
individuals would still presumably be allowed choices among annuity op- 
tions and the age of settlement. The account-balance-weighted mortality 
table might also differ from the population mortality table because of in- 
come-related differences in mortality rates. 
The second set of projected mortality rates that we  use corresponds to 
that for current annuitants. Mitchell et al. (1999) develop an algorithm 
that combines information from the new Annuity 2000 mortality table (Jo- 
hansen 1996), the older 1983 individual annuitant mortality table, and the 
projected rate of mortality improvement in the SSA’s population mortality 
tables. The algorithm generates projected mortality rates for the set of annu- 
itants who purchase annuity contracts in a given year. There are substantial 
differences between  the  population  and  the  annuitant  mortality  rates. 
Mitchell et al. (1999) show that, in  1995, the annual mortality  rate for 
annuitants between the ages of sixty-five and seventy-five was roughly half 
the mortality rate for those in the general population. This translates into 
a substantially larger EPDV of annuity payouts when we  use the annuitant 
mortality table, rather than the population mortality table, for valuation. 
We  focus exclusively on valuing annuities in  a pretax  environment. 
While this follows in the tradition of most previous studies, Mitchell et al. 
(1999) also report information on the after-tax value of annuity payouts, 
recognizing that payouts from nonqualified annuities are partially taxable, 
and using an after-tax nominal interest rate for discounting. The EPDV 
of annuity payouts relative to premium costs was very similar in the pretax 
and posttax  cases, however, so we  focus on the simpler pretax case in 
this analysis. 180  James M. Poterba and Mark J. Warshawsky 
Table 5.2 reports our estimates of the expected discounted value of an- 
nuity payouts using the all-company average payout rates from table 5.1 
above. The first column shows calculations based on our estimate of  the 
1998 cohort mortality table for the general population, while the second 
column presents calculations based on the 1998 cohort mortality table for 
annuitants. The first panel presents results using riskless Treasury bond 
discount rates, while the second panel corresponds to our “risky interest- 
rate” discount factor. We report the EPDV of annuity payments per pre- 
mium dollar. Using the general population  mortality tables for a sixty- 
five-year-old man and the Treasury yield curve, the value per premium 
dollar for a life annuity is 0.849 for a nonqualified annuity. For a woman 
of the same age, the average value is 0.875. When we value the same annui- 
ties using the annuitant mortality  table, the EPDV of payouts rises to 
0.970 for men and 0.952 for women. These values are closer to unity than 
the estimates in previous studies that have used the riskless yield curve to 
discount annuity payouts. 
The lower panel of table 5.2 reports our findings using riskier interest 
rates. In this case, the expected discounted value of payouts is lower than 
in the first panel. The calculations using the population  mortality table 
suggest that the EPDV of payouts is between seventy-five and eighty cents 
per premium dollar. Using the mortality table for annuitants raises this 
Table 5.2  EPDV of Annuity Payouts, per Dollar of Premium Payment, Individual 
Annuity Policies Offered by Commercial Insurers, June 1998 
EPDV/Premium Using  EPDV/Premium Using 
Population Mortality Table  Annuitant Mortality Table 
Age and Gender of 
Annuity Buyer  Qualified  Nonqualified  Qualified  Nonqualified 
Treasury discount rates: 
Male, age 55 
Male, age 65 
Male, age 75 
Female, age 55 
Female, age 65 
Female, age 75 
Male, age 55 
Male, age 65 
Male, age 75 
Female, age 55 
Female, age 65 
Female, age 75 

















































Source: Authors’ tabulations based on data in table 5.1 above and information described in 
the text. 
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estimate to between eighty-two and eighty-seven cents per dollar. Whether 
it makes more sense to use the riskless or the risky discount rate is open 
to some question. The historical default risk on annuity payouts has been 
extremely low, so annuity purchasers probably view their annuity income 
stream as riskless. Yet the portfolio held by insurance companies that offer 
annuity products is not restricted to riskless Treasury securities. It is clear 
from the results in table 5.2 that assumptions about the risk premium that 
should be included in the discount factor have an important effect on the 
estimated level of annuity payouts relative to premium costs. 
In table 5.2, payout values per premium dollar that are less than unity 
imply that an annuity purchaser would effectively face a “transaction cost” 
when purchasing an annuity from a commercial insurance carrier. This is 
equivalent to purchasing an actuarially fair annuity, defined as one for 
which the EPDV of payouts equals the policy’s premium cost but one that 
involves having to give up a fraction of one’s wealth before investing the 
remainder in this annuity product. An annuity with payouts that have an 
EPDV equal to the premium cost is likely to be unattainable since this 
does not  allow for any administrative costs, premium taxes, corporate 
taxes, commissions, advertising, overhead, assumption of risks, or other 
costs on the part of the insurance company selling the policy. 
The difference between the EPDV calculations based on the population 
mortality table and those based on the annuitant mortality table provides 
some insight into the costs of adverse selection in the individual annuity 
market. For example, for an annuity sold to a sixty-five-year-old man, the 
cost of adverse selection is 12.1 percent of the annuity premium (97.0 - 
84.9). This is roughly the same magnitude as the estimated cost of adverse 
selection in several previous studies of the annuity market. When we  use 
the “risky term structure” to perform the annuity valuation exercise, the 
resulting estimates suggest that adverse selection accounts for a smaller 
fraction of the differential between the EPDV of payouts and the premium 
cost for a randomly selected individual in the population. 
The findings in table 5.2 suggest that the insurance companies offering 
annuities are currently charging annuitants less for the administrative, 
sales, and other charges associated with individual annuity products than 
previous studies have suggested. This move toward more aggressive pric- 
ing may alternatively reflect declining investment risks to insurance com- 
panies, rising competition in the annuity market, or the slow adaptation 
of  the assumed mortality tables to improvements in  life expectancy. An 
important issue for further analysis is the source of time-series variation 
in the EPDV, relative to premium costs, for individual annuities. 
Calculations like those in table 5.2 have been interpreted as suggesting 
that annuities are “expensive” because a sixty-five-year-old buyer with the 
average mortality in the population gives up at least fifteen cents per dollar 
of premium in order to buy an annuity. Although it is true that the EPDV 182  James M. Poterba and Mark J. Warshawsky 
of annuity payouts is less than the cost of the annuity, it does not follow 
that annuities are unattractive to those in the population at large. Results 
on the utility gains associated with annuitization for representative indi- 
viduals, with plausible risk tolerance and facing the population mortality 
risk, suggest that the gains from avoiding uncertainty about length of life 
are sufficient to warrant purchasing an annuity, even if the EPDV is sub- 
stantially below the premium amount. Mitchell et al. (1999) report simula- 
tion results that support this conclusion. They also suggest that these re- 
sults are sensitive to several features of  the economic environment. In 
particular, individuals who already have a substantial share of their retire- 
ment wealth in an annuitized form, such as social security or a defined- 
benefit pension plan, will  be willing to pay less for an annuity. Married 
individuals also tend to value annuities less than single individuals. Brown 
and Poterba (1998) show that this is because of the partial “mortality-risk 
pooling” that takes place within the household. Finally, there may be a 
perception among investors of better value from life annuities when inter- 
est rates are low. 
5.2  Individual Annuities Available to Participants in the TSP 
The last section described individual annuity policies that are univer- 
sally available in the private annuity market. In this section and the next, 
we  describe policies that are available only to participants in two large 
group retirement-saving plans. The experience with these plans may pro- 
vide some insight into the potential operation of annuitization options 
under various government individual accounts saving programs. 
The Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) is a 401(k) defined-contribution retire- 
ment plan for federal employees. Congress established the TSP in the Fed- 
eral Employees’ Retirement System (FERS) Act of 1986. For federal em- 
ployees hired after 31 December 1983, the TSP is an integral part of the 
retirement-income package, which also includes social security and the 
FERS basic annuity, a standard defined-benefit pension plan. For federal 
employees hired before 1984 who did not elect to switch to FERS, the TSP 
is a voluntary supplement to the Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) 
annuity, a generous back-loaded defined-benefit plan. 
Employees in FERS can contribute up to 10 percent of pay to the TSP. 
The  federal  government contributes  1 percent  of  pay  automatically, 
matches the first 3 percent of pay contributed by the employee dollar for 
dollar, and matches the next 2 percent at fifty cents on the dollar. Employ- 
ees in CSRS can contribute up to 5 percent of pay to the TSP but receive 
no federal government contributions. For all employees, contributions to 
the TSP are capped at $10,000 per year. There are no nondiscrimination 
requirements limiting contributions, as occurs in  the private sector, al- 
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immediate vesting for employee and government matching contributions 
and earnings, while the service requirement to vest in the automatic gov- 
ernment contribution and earnings is generally three years. The service 
requirement for TSP eligibility is as long as one year. 
Contributions can be directed to three investment funds: a short-term 
government securities (G) fund, a common  stock index (S&PSOO)  (C) 
fund, and a fixed-income index (Lehman Brothers Aggregate) (F) fund. 
There are plans to add two more investment choices: a small-capitalization 
stock index fund and an international stock index fund. All investment 
funds  use  only  a  passive  indexation  strategy.  Valuation  occurs  on  a 
monthly basis; interfund transfers occur at the end of the month. Redirec- 
tion of future contributions among the various investment funds as well 
as enrollment can be done only during semiannual open seasons in the 
winter and summer months.  Account-balance  statements  are sent  out 
semiannually. Loans are allowed from employee contributions and earn- 
ings while the participant is  in federal service. Limited in-service with- 
drawals for financial hardship or after reaching age fifty-nine and a half 
are also allowed. 
After a federal employee leaves government service, there are three ways 
to withdraw assets from the TSP: a life annuity, a lump sum, or a series of 
monthly payments; these methods may be used in any combination. The 
lump-sum or monthly payments can be rolled over to another qualified 
retirement plan, such as an IRA. Like other retirement plans, balances in 
a TSP account are subject to the federal minimum distribution require- 
ments, mandating distributions after age seventy and a half according to 
IRS life-expectancy  tables. Warshawsky (1998) provides a detailed descrip- 
tion and analysis of these requirements. 
The Federal Retirement Thrift Investment Board (FRTIB), an indepen- 
dent federal agency, administers the TSP.  Governance of the agency is 
carried out by  a five-person, part-time board of  presidential appointees 
and by a full-time executive director selected by the appointees. The board 
members and the executive director are fiduciaries for the TSP, and they 
are required to act solely in the interest of  participants.  Administrative 
and most investment expenses are paid out of investment earnings and 
forfeitures of the automatic 1 percent-of-pay  contributions, not through 
any annual congressional appropriation. In 1997, these expenses were 0.09 
percent of assets, or nine basis points. This gross expense ratio has de- 
clined rapidly from sixty-seven basis points in  1988 as average TSP ac- 
count size has grown. The FRTIB controls a single record-keeping system, 
coordinating among 130 different federal agency payroll systems. Admin- 
istrative personnel throughout the federal government also assist with ad- 
ministration for, and the education of, participants. 
The latest available data show that participation in the TSP by  FERS 
employees is  86.1 percent and by CSRS employees about 61 percent. As 184  James M. Poterba and Mark J. Warshawsky 
of October 1998, the TSP had 2.4 million individual accounts, $71.5 bil- 
lion in investment assets ($28.3 billion in the G fund, $39.2 billion in the 
C fund, and $4.0 billion in the F fund), and loans totaling more than $2.4 
billion outstanding. During 1997, the TSP received $7 billion in contribu- 
tions and disbursed almost $1.4 billion in benefits. In dollar terms, most 
payments are disbursed as transfers to IRAs and other qualified plans; the 
second- and third-largest disbursement categories are lump  sums and 
death benefits. Net investment income, which equals the net change in 
market value plus investment earnings, was over $8.6 billion. 
5.2. I  TSP Life-Annuity-Payment Options 
Federal law requires the FRTIB to make available to participants who 
have left federal service five types of life annuities: a single-life annuity 
with level payments, a  single-life annuity with  increasing payments, a 
joint-life annuity (with spouse) with level payments, a joint-life annuity 
(with spouse) with increasing payments, and a joint-life annuity (with 
someone other than a spouse who has an insurable interest in the partici- 
pant) with level payments. Monthly payouts begin thirty days after a TSP 
annuity is purchased. Joint-life annuities are available either as 50 percent 
or as 100 percent survivor annuities. In an increasing-payment annuity, 
the amount of the monthly payment can change each year on the anniver- 
sary date. The amount of the change is based on the change in the con- 
sumer price index (CPI-W). Increases cannot exceed 3 percent per year, 
but monthly payments cannot decrease even if the CPI declines. The fact 
that the TSP offers a kind of inflation-indexed annuity is  of some note. 
One concern sometimes raised about the private annuity market in the 
United States has been that most annuities are specified in nominal rather 
than real terms and that, as such, they expose annuitants to inflation risk. 
It is noteworthy that partially indexed TSP annuities were  offered by  a 
private insurance carrier prior to the introduction of inflation-linked Trea- 
sury bonds in the United States. 
The FRTIB offers two additional annuity features: cash refund and ten- 
year certain. Under these features, minimum amounts will  be paid to a 
named beneficiary if the participant (and his or her joint annuitant if ap- 
plicable) dies before the minimum amounts have been paid out. In particu- 
lar, under a cash refund, if the participant dies before an amount equal to 
the balance used to purchase the annuity has been paid out, the difference 
between the purchase balance and the sum of monthly payments already 
made will  be paid to the beneficiary in a lump sum. Under a ten-year 
certain annuity, if the participant dies before receiving annuity payments 
for a ten-year period, payments will  continue to the beneficiary for the 
rest of the ten-year period. This latter feature, however, cannot be com- 
bined with a joint-life annuity in the TSP. Of course, utilization of these 
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TSP does not offer any variable annuities with payouts linked to the invest- 
ment performance of an underlying fund or asset class. 
5.2.2  The Most Recent Request for a Private Insurance 
Carrier to Supply TSP Annuities 
TSP annuities are purchased from a commercial annuity vendor. They 
are not guaranteed by the federal government but depend on the annuity 
issuer’s claims-paying ability. These tax-qualified, single-premium-imme- 
diate annuities are currently provided through a master annuity contract 
between the FRTIB and the Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (Met- 
Life), a company chosen by the FRTIB. The competitive bidding process 
is handled through a request for proposal (RFP) inviting submissions to 
provide annuity services. The following is a summary of the RFP issued in 
July 1995 by the FRTIB inviting submissions to provide annuity services. 
The prior RFP was issued in  1990 and was also awarded to MetLife for 
three years and a two-year extension. With some exceptions noted below, 
the 1990 RFP was identical to the 1995 RFP. 
The RFP stated that the annuity program had to conform to certain 
requirements. In particular, the amount of the monthly payment from a 
life  annuity provided  by  the  insurance company (the  contractor) per 
$1,000 of single premium had to be an “interest-adjusted tabular monthly 
annuity payment for the specified annuity option times the Contractor 
annuity payment rate.” The higher the annuity-payout rate, the more at- 
tractive the annuity contracts are from the standpoint of the annuitant. 
The specified annuity options have been described above. The interest ad- 
justment and tabular monthly annuity-payment methods, described ex- 
plicitly in  the RFP, were based generally on actuarial formulas and will 
be  summarized below. The contractor annuity-payment rate is the single 
number indicating the relative value of the entire bid; it has to be guaran- 
teed for the term of the contract. In the 1990 RFP, there were two contract 
rates, one for the first three years of the contract, another for the last two 
years if the TSP decided to extend the contract. Our calculations suggest 
that MetLife’s winning 1995 bid had a contractor rate of 1.039. This is not 
a statistic supplied by the FRTIB; it is based on our estimates, which have 
not been validated by the FRTIB. 
The tabular monthly annuity-payment approach was chosen as a mech- 
anism to readily adjust payment levels from newly purchased individual 
annuities to reflect changes in market interest rates over the course of the 
contract with the insurance company. This approach tends to reduce the 
interest-rate risk of  the contractor, and it was hoped that it would lead 
to a more competitive contractor annuity-payment rate. Tabular monthly 
annuity payments were specified in the RFP on the basis of two assump- 
tions: (1) an interest-rate index and (2)  a mortality table. No explicit provi- 
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individual annuity mortality table (1983 IAM) on a unisex basis, assuming 
50 percent females and 50 percent males would be using the annuity pro- 
gram. Selection of the 1983 IAM was based on very limited mortality ex- 
perience with TSP annuities since the start of the TSP in 1987. As of De- 
cember 1994, the gender distribution for the TSP population was 42 per- 
cent female and 58 percent male, although, in older groups, the male share 
was higher, 63 percent. In the 1990 RFP, the indicated mortality table was 
the 1971 IAM table based on 80 percent males and 20 percent females. In 
joint-life situations, the second life was assumed to be 20 percent male 
and 80 percent female. According to the  1990 RFP, the  1971 IAM was 
selected because its rates were similar to 90 percent of the mortality expe- 
rienced between 1983 and 1987 under the CSRS; the 10 percent reduction 
of CSRS experience factors was to recognize as of  1990 projected future 
mortality improvement and adverse selection. 
The interest-rate index, calculated monthly, is a three-month moving av- 
erage of the ten-year Treasury note constant maturity series. The monthly 
calculation of the interest-rate index applies to new  annuity purchases 
only; payments under previously issued annuities are not affected. 
The table of monthly annuity payments presented in the RFP  was based 
on the mortality table described above and a 7 percent interest rate. Table 
5.3, copied from the RFP, shows the worksheet that describes the interest- 
adjustment  calculations. The interest-adjustment factors were  also pre- 
sented in the RFP in tables for given age ranges and annuity-option com- 
binations. The factors were calculated as a simple linear interest-rate ad- 
justment  by  taking  the  ratio  of  the monthly payment  at an 8 percent 
interest rate to the monthly payment at a 7 percent interest rate and sub- 
tracting one; that is, the factors are just a linear interpolation. The adjust- 
ment factors are to be multiplied by the difference in the current interest- 
rate index and 7 percent; this product, in turn, is to be multiplied by  the 
tabular monthly annuity payment to produce the change in the monthly 
annuity payment, finally resulting in the interest-adjusted monthly annu- 
ity payment. 
The RFP states that the interest-adjustment factors are highly accurate 
at market interest rates between 7 and 8 percent. It also noted, however, that 
accurate adjustment would not be achieved if market rates were to differ 
greatly from the base 7 percent interest-rate assumption. Therefore, if an- 
nuitants were to become disadvantaged, the FRTIB retained the right to 
recalculate the tabular monthly payments on the basis of a revised interest- 
rate index assumption reflecting significant long-term changes in market 
conditions. The November 1998 interest-rate index was 5.25 percent; for a 
single-life level-payment annuity of $1,000 issued to a participant age sixty- 
five, the difference between a precisely calculated monthly annuity pay- 
ment of $7.02 and an interest-adjusted monthly annuity payment of $7.40 
was $0.38, to the advantage of the annuitant. This outcome, of course, 
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Table 5.3  Annuity Calculation Worksheet from RFP for Annuities Provided to 
TSP Participants 
Participant information: 
1. Annuity option 
2. Participant age  62 
59 
4. Age difference (if a joint-life annuity). 
J&S-50%, level, no cash refund 
3. Joint annuitant age (if a joint-life annuity) 
Joint annuitant is 
5. TSP account balance 
3 years younger 
$30,000.00 
Calculation of monthly annuity payment (before interest 
adjustment): 
6. Amount available for annuity in thousands of 
7. Monthly annuity factor per $1,000 account 
dollars: line 5 + $1,000 
balance: 
$30.00000 
For single-life annuity, use table 5.2.1 .a 
For joint-life annuity, use table 5.2.1  .b 
8. Preliminary estimate of monthly annuity 
7.64 (see B.3., step 1) 
$226.20 (see B.3., step 2)  payment 
Interest-adjusted monthly annuity payment: 
9. Current interest-rate index  6.625 
10. Interest-rate index used in monthly annuity 
factor tables  7.000 
1  1. Index increase (decrease): line 9 -  line 10 
12. Interest-adjustment factor: 
(0.375) 
For single-life annuity, use table J.2.2.a 
For joint-life annuity, use table J.2.2.b 
13. Adjustment multiplier: line 11 X line 12 




Interest-adjusted monthly annuity payment: 
line 8 + line 14  $218.96 (see B.3., step 3) 
Source; RFP-TIB-95-02 (a request for proposal dated 21 July 1995 from the Federal Retire- 
ment Thrift Investment Board), p. 5-14, 
As noted above, the contractor also had to offer an increasing life annu- 
ity tied to year-over-year CPI changes (calculated as an average over July, 
August, and September), capped at 3 percent. The actuarial formula used 
in the RFP to produce the tabular monthly annuity payment assumes that 
the annual increases will always be 3 percent; if, however, inflation runs be- 
low 3 percent, as in recent quarters, the insurance company issuing these 
annuities will  reap a profit. Furthermore, newly  purchased increasing- 
level  annuities are priced to the disadvantage of  the TSP annuitant in 
the current economic environment, in which inflation rates are below 2 
percent. 
The contract was to run for three years; the contract that we  study ex- 
pired at the end of December 1998. The FRTIB, however, had the option 
to extend the contract for two more years. Administration and reporting 
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Table 5.4  Initial Monthly Payments ($) per $100,000 Accumulation from TSP 
Annuities Purchased in June 1998 
~  ~  ~ 
Single-Life  Joint-and-Survivor 
Annuity  Annuity 
Level  Increasing  Level  Increasing 
Age  Payment  Payment  Payment  Payment 
55  635  446  568  382 
60  688  504  60 1  422 
65  763  581  650  477 
70  858  676  709  540 
75  996  813  796  628 
Note: Increasing-payment annuity is based on the year-over-year change in the CPI, up to 
3 percent. The joint-and-survivor  annuity rates quoted here are for benefits of 100 percent 
to a survivor the same age as the annuitant. All annuity rates are unisex. There are no guaran- 
teed periods or cash-refund features chosen. 
bility of the insurance company through the termination of the last annu- 
ity purchased. There are numerous reporting requirements placed on the 
contractor, pertaining to the types and amounts of annuities purchased, 
mortality experience, and significant corporate events of the contractor. 
If  the FRTIB views  any corporate events, such as loss of customers or 
change in agency rating, as particularly harmful, it has the right to termi- 
nate the contract at any time or to demand corrective action. 
In picking a winning bid, the RFP indicated that technical quality was 
more important than cost. Technical quality factors included the contrac- 
tor’s rating by Standard and Poor’s, Moody’s, or Duff and Phelps (required 
to be AA or higher), ability to do business nationally, a balance sheet in- 
dicating financial strength, demonstrated continuing profitability, diversi- 
fication in  lines of  business, experience with large master  annuity con- 
tracts, a sound business plan, and the quality of past performance. Cost 
factors  were  evaluated  by  sole  reference  to  the  contractor  annuity- 
payment-rate bid. 
5.2.3  Current Annuity-Payout Rates and Utilization Rates 
The amount of the monthly payment coming from a TSP life annuity 
depends on the annuity options chosen, the age of the participant when 
the annuity is purchased (and the age of the joint annuitant if applicable), 
the balance in the TSP account used to purchase the annuity, the market 
interest levels when the annuity is purchased, and the contractor annuity- 
payment rate. Table 5.4 shows initial monthly payments per $100,000 pre- 
mium for various issue ages and options for life annuities purchased in 
June 1998. For example, a level-payment single-life annuity purchased by 
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This is 4.2 percent greater than the average payout on a nonqualified an- 
nuity offered to men by  commercial insurance firms (table 5.1 above) and 
6 percent greater than their average payout on qualified annuities. As a 
point of comparison, a qualified SPIA (single premium individual annu- 
ity) issued by  MetLife through an agent to a sixty-five-year-old in June 
1998 will provide $664 monthly per $100,000 premium. The TSP interest- 
rate index in June 1998 was 5.625 percent. 
Table 5.4 demonstrates that initial monthly payments are an increasing 
function of the age at which the annuity is issued, that they are higher for 
single as opposed to joint-and-survivor annuities, and that they are higher 
for level- as opposed to increasing-payment annuities. For example, for an 
individual age sixty-five, the level payment is 31 percent higher than the 
initial payment from an increasing annuity. For those age sixty-five, the 
level monthly single-life annuity payment is 25 percent higher compared 
to a level-payment joint-and-survivor annuity. 
Almost 12 percent of the TSP participant population is age fifty-five or 
older. Hence, each year, there should be a considerable number of retiring 
participants settling their TSP accounts potentially interested in purchas- 
ing a life annuity. At the same time, because most of the retiring federal 
workers are still CSRS as opposed to FERS participants, the TSP system 
currently represents a relatively unimportant component of the retirement 
resources of the average retiring worker settling his or her TSP account. 
The significance of  the TSP system for federal workers’ retirement  in- 
comes will grow over time as the average size of the account balance in- 
creases and as FERS participants begin to retire. 
Table 5.5 shows the basic type, number, and amount of TSP annuities 
purchased between the inception of the program and September 1998. 
Over one thousand annuities worth over $30 million were  purchased in 
1995, the high point thus far for TSP annuity activity. Since then, annual 
activity has fallen to about seven hundred purchased. It is possible that 
the absence from the option menu of a variable annuity whose payout is 
tied to the performance of the equity market, which boomed in 1996 and 
1997, led to reduced interest in TSP annuities. The average size of a TSP 
annuity purchased has increased significantly, however, in line with the 
increase in the average size of a TSP account balance as the overall TSP 
program begins to mature. In  1990, the average annuity purchased was 
worth only $8,500; by  1998, the average was over $42,000. 
Table 5.5 indicates that the majority of annuities purchased contain the 
joint-and-survivor option, most providing a 100 percent benefit to the sur- 
vivor. A  large minority  of annuities purchased,  however, are for single 
lives. FRTIB statistics through March 1995 indicate that most annuities 
purchased, whether single or  joint and survivor, are level payment with no 
cash refund or ten-year certain features chosen. The increasing-payment 
annuity was chosen by fewer than 12 percent of annuity purchasers. Fe- 190  James M. Poterba and Mark J. Warshawsky 
Table 5.5  Basic Type, Number, and Amount of TSP Annuities Purchased, 
1988September 1998 
Number of Annuities Purchased 
Single  Insurable 







































































































































'Through  September 
male  participants  are more  likely than  male  participants  to  choose a 
single-life annuity than a joint-and-survivor annuity. 
These statistics provide important information on the operation of the 
TSP annuitization program. The most important finding is that annuity 
payouts within  the  TSP annuity  contract  are approximately 5 percent 
greater than  those in  the private annuity market. This may reflect cost 
reductions associated with selling a large volume of annuities of a specified 
type or a weakened competitive position of  the annuity provider when 
negotiating with the federal government. If we  use the TSP annuity pay- 
outs for a sixty-five-year-old man in our EPDV algorithm, because these 
payouts are 4.2 percent greater than the average payout for commercial 
single-premium nonqualified annuity policies at the same time, the EPDV 
of payouts will also be 4.2 percent greater than the value reported in table 
5.2 above. In this case, we  conclude that the EPDV is 0.886 (or 1.042 X Costs of Annuitizing Retirement Payouts from Individual Accounts  191 
0.850, where 0.850 is the entry in table 5.2, col. 2, row 2) times the pre- 
mium payment. 
5.3  Individual Annuities Offered by TIAA-CREF 
for Pension-Plan Participants 
The Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association (TIAA) is a nonprofit 
stock life insurance company, organized under the laws of New York State. 
It was founded on 4 March 1918 by the Carnegie Foundation for the Ad- 
vancement of Teaching to aid education and research institutions by pro- 
viding low-cost retirement products and counseling about lifelong finan- 
cial security to their employees. TIAA is the companion organization of 
the College Retirement Equities Fund (CREF), the first company in the 
United States to issue a variable annuity. CREF was established in  1952 
by  a special act of the New York  State Legislature and, since 1988, has 
been registered with the SEC as an open-end investment company. To- 
gether, TIAA and CREF form the principal retirement system for the na- 
tion’s education and research communities. In addition to funding vehicles 
for employer-sponsored pension plans, TIAA-CREF also offers a variety 
of  other financial services, including IRAs, individual and group insur- 
ance products, mutual funds, trust services, and tuition saving plans. 
The basic principles of the TIAA-CREF pension system in higher edu- 
cation, established as a result of a 1917 study by a group of educators and 
actuaries, still generally hold: (1) institutions provide immediately vested 
defined-contribution plans sponsored by the employer (obviating the need 
for  insurance  agents  selling individual  annuity  policies);  (2)  plans  are 
funded by contributions from employers and employees adequate to pro- 
vide acceptable incomes in retirement under reasonable assumptions; and 
(3) retirement accounts are owned by employees through individual TIAA 
and CREF retirement-annuity contracts (creating portability as employ- 
ees, particularly faculty and administrators, move from institution to in- 
stitution). In this system, TIAA-CREF acts as a kind of multiemployer 
pension plan, achieving economies of scale and scope in investment man- 
agement, plan design, and account administration, pooling risks, and act- 
ing in the best interests of plan sponsors and participants. 
The “classic” TIAA-CREF basic pension plan consists of an immedi- 
ately vested individual contract arrangement with a 7.5 percent-of-pay 
contribution from the employer and a 5 percent-of-pay  contribution from 
the employee, Because each TIAA-CREF pension plan is sponsored by a 
separate institution, however, the contribution rates and other plan rules 
will differ across institutions. TIAA-CREF assists each institution in the 
establishment and administration of its pension plans, but the final deci- 
sion on plan features is made by the sponsoring institution. If an employee 
wishes to make additional tax-favored contributions, he or she may do so 
through salary reductions paid to the basic pension plan or to a supple- 192  James M. Poterba and Mark J. Warshawsky 
Table 5.6  TIAA-CREF Investment Accounts and Asset Classes 
Asset Class and Investment Account 
Asset Amounts as 
of 31 October 1998 
Inception Date  ($millions) 
Guaranteed: 
Equity: 
TIAA traditional annuity (general account)a 
CREF stock 
CREF social choiceb 
CREF global equities 
CREF growth 
CREF equity index 
CREF money market 
CREF bond market 
CREF inflation-linked bond 




23 April 1918 
1 July 1952 
1 March 1990 
1 May 1992 
29 April 1994 
29 April 1994 
1 April 1988 
1 March 1990 
1 May 1997 












dAlso  includes investments held for after-tax (nonpension) fixed annuities and various reserves and lia- 
bilities. 
bThe CREF social choice account is a balanced account composed of bonds and, mainly, equities. 
mental retirement annuity (SRA) plan sponsored by the institution. Most 
pension plans established by educational institutions are governed by the 
requirements of section 403(b) of the tax code. 
As  of  1998, participants in TIAA-CREF pension plans may allocate 
their contributions and accumulations among ten different investment ac- 
counts, which can be categorized into four asset classes. There is  some 
institutional control at each participating institution with respect to the 
accounts offered, and some institutions do not offer all the accounts. 
Table 5.6 shows these accounts and classes, with their inception dates, 
and asset amounts as of 31 October 1998. Ameriks, King, and Warshaw- 
sky (1 997) trace the choices that TIAA-CREF participants have been mak- 
ing in recent years in their allocation of contributions and of accumula- 
tions under basic employer-sponsored pension plans. Although each of 
the investment accounts has unique risk and return characteristics, we  will 
describe only the two largest and oldest accounts-the  TIAA traditional 
annuity and the CREF stock account. 
For the traditional annuity-a  stable-value account-TIAA  guarantees 
principal and a 3 percent interest rate for accumulations. All major ratings 
agencies currently give TIAA the highest possible ratings for its claims- 
paying  ability.  In  addition,  there are dividends declared by  the TIAA 
Board of Trustees that remain in effect through the end of the “dividend 
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paid every year since 1948. The dividend schedules are somewhat complex, 
tied  to the timing of past  contributions and intended  to assure equity 
across groups of participants who contributed to TIAA at varied interest- 
rate levels. Dividend levels are set at the discretion of the TIAA board and 
reflect TIAA’s investment experience. 
To  back its guarantees, and to maximize dividends, TIAA invests in 
publicly traded bonds, direct loans to business and industry, commercial 
mortgages, and real estate. Many of the loans and mortgages (both domes- 
tic and foreign) entail long-term commitments, are relatively illiquid, and 
hence offer higher returns than publicly traded securities. TIAA’s  invest- 
ment returns are consistently among the highest of general accounts in 
the life insurance industry. Because of the illiquidity of many of its loans, 
TIAA restricts payouts from the traditional annuity to life annuities or 
over  a ten-year period.  (Investment in the traditional  annuity  through 
SRAs, however, does not entail these restrictions, although the dividends 
paid on these accumulations are fifty basis points less than those on accu- 
mulations in the basic pension plans. Beginning in 1999, restrictions on 
converting from a TIAA lifetime-annuity income to an equity-based vari- 
able annuity were relaxed, with transfers of up to 20 percent of income in 
each year permitted.) This restriction on payouts also encompasses the 
transfer of  TIAA traditional annuity accumulations to the other TIAA 
and CREF investment accounts. All other accounts are variable, marked 
to the market daily, and generally have no restrictions on transfers or with- 
drawals. Individual institutions may impose restrictions on withdrawals by 
participants in their basic pension plans from the TIAA traditional annu- 
ity and from the variable accounts. 
The CREF stock account is an omnibus growth and income equity ac- 
count, investing in US. and foreign stocks, using a blend of investment 
styles. The domestic portion of the account, currently over 80 percent of 
the portfolio, is invested according to an “enhanced” index strategy. The 
index is the Russell 3000, and the enhancement refers to various quantita- 
tive trading techniques intended to take advantage of arbitrage opportu- 
nities. The remainder  of the  portfolio  employs active management  for 
domestic and foreign stocks. There are no guarantees of principal or in- 
vestment return for CREF stock or the other variable accounts. For the 
variable accounts, valuation occurs on a daily basis; interfund transfers 
occur at the end of each trading day. 
Transfers of accumulated assets and the redirection of future contribu- 
tions among the various investment accounts can be done at any time 
through an automated telephone service and via the Internet. Account- 
balance statements are sent out quarterly; balances are also available daily 
through phone-service centers and the Internet. An annuity benefit report 
is sent out annually, projecting for the individual, under reasonable as- 
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tions  and  investment returns.  Consultants  offer  individual  and  group 
counseling at regional offices or participating institutions. 
Administrative and investment expenses for the TIAA-CREF pension 
system are paid from investment earnings. At the current level of about 
thirty to thirty-five basis points, these expenses are among the lowest in 
the insurance and mutual fund industries. The responsibility for oversight 
of TIAA-CREF management  lies with  its boards  of trustees. Because 
TIAA and CREF, the main components of the parent organization, are 
incorporated under different laws and are regulated by  different govern- 
ment agencies, there is one board for TIAA and another for CREF. A 
board of overseers ensures that TIAA-CREF is meeting its charter pur- 
poses; this board also elects trustees to the TIAA Board. CREF partici- 
pants directly elect CREF trustees, in the same manner as mutual fund 
shareholders who have votes in proportion to the shares they own. Mem- 
bers of the boards are a diverse group of men and women, representing 
academic (faculty and administration), business, and philanthropic insti- 
tutions, with a wide range of expertise and interests, including education, 
management, government, economics, finance, law, and corporate gover- 
nance. Most board members are themselves longtime TIAA-CREF parti- 
cipants; only two are TIAA-CREF executives. 
Warshawsky and Ameriks (1  996) report that pension coverage (at over 
95 percent) and participation  (at 80 percent) are significantly greater in 
the higher education sector than in the rest of the full-time labor force (71 
percent and 59 percent, respectively). As of 31 October 1998, there were 
1,792,942  participants in the accumulation phase, 290,616 participants re- 
ceiving annuity-income payments in the TIAA-CREF pension  system, 
and 8,711 institutions of all sizes sponsoring TIAA-CREF pension plans. 
5.3.1  Life-Annuity-Payment Options 
At one time, all TIAA-CREF basic pension plans allowed for distribu- 
tions only through a life annuity or death benefit (supplemental plans have 
always been “cashable”). In 1988, this systemwide restriction was removed 
for basic plans, although a small number of sponsoring institutions chose 
to retain it. Hence, with the exception of accumulations in the TIM  tradi- 
tional annuity, for most TIAA-CREF pension plans, when an employee 
leaves the service of his or her employer, accumulations can be withdrawn 
as a life annuity, in a lump sum, in a systematic series of payments, or in 
any combination  of  lump sum, systematic withdrawals, and life annui- 
ties. In addition, for all plans, participants over age seventy and a half 
can, since 1991, withdraw funds through a minimum-distribution option 
(MDO), and participants age fifty-five and over can, since 1989, receive 
payments of current interest credited to TIAA accumulations through an 
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benefit is  also available from TIAA and CREF, whereby  10 percent  of 
accumulations are available as a lump sum on retirement. 
Despite the flexibilities available, most TIAA-CREF participants still 
choose a life annuity when they retire. TIAA-CREF offers both single- 
and two-life annuities, with or without guaranteed periods of ten, fifteen, 
or twenty years. The options available for two-life annuities are two-thirds 
benefit to survivor, full benefit to survivor, and half benefit to second an- 
nuity partner. Payout levels  reflect the option chosen. Payments can be 
made on a monthly, quarterly, semiannual, or annual basis. 
Life annuities can be drawn from any of the investment accounts. The 
TIAA traditional annuity guarantees the interest rate (2Ih  percent) and 
mortality  assumptions for payouts through  life annuities. These payout 
guarantees actually begin in the accumulation phase and hence can be in 
effect for several decades. In addition, the TIAA board declares annual 
dividends to annuitants. 
There are two different life-annuity-payment methods  available from 
TIAA-standard  and graded. For both methods, payment is  based on 
assumed mortality, guaranteed  interest, and dividends. Under the stan- 
dard payment method, the initial income level is maintained until there is a 
change in dividends; year-over-year dividend changes in the payout phase 
historically have been small. Under the graded payment method, initial 
income is based on a 4 percent payout. Any remaining dividends are rein- 
vested and used to buy additional future income. This method was first 
proposed by Biggs (1 969) and put in place by TIAA in 1982 to help protect 
annuitants from inflation. King (1 995) calculated hypothetical payments 
under the graded method for various periods beginning in the 1970s and 
found that purchasing power was preserved, indeed enhanced, through 
1995, although, in the years of high inflation in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, purchasing  power  lagged  somewhat.  Annuitants  who  initially 
choose the graded method can later switch to the standard method, but 
not vice versa. 
Life annuities can also be drawn from any of  the variable accounts. 
Payouts are entirely variable, reflecting the investment performance and 
expenses of the account and the mortality experience of annuitants using 
the account. Initial payments are calculated using the accumulation, the 
income option chosen, an assumed effective interest rate of 4 percent, and 
mortality assumptions, currently the unisex version of the 1983 IAM table 
set back  two months  for each complete year that has elapsed since 31 
March  1986 to account for ongoing gains in longevity. After the initial 
payment, payment amounts change to reflect mainly the performance of 
the investment portfolio either annually or monthly, at the option of the 
participant. 
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than that from the TIAA traditional annuity, participants with variable 
annuities are able to devise a retirement-income portfolio more aligned 
with their risk tolerances. For the equity accounts, over long time periods, 
variable annuitants participate in general economic performance, which 
has been  significantly positive in the United States and other countries 
over most recent historical periods. Annuitants may  switch among the 
variable accounts or to the TIAA traditional annuity on any business day, 
as often as once per calendar quarter. Income options, annuitant(s), and 
guaranteed period, however, must be maintained on the switch. 
5.3.2  Current Annuity Payout Rates and Annuity Utilization 
Table 5.7 shows initial monthly payments per $100,000 accumulation in 
a basic pension plan for various issue ages and options for life annuities 
issued by TIAA-CREF  on 1 June 1998. For TIAA, the annuity payout re- 
flects current dividend levels assuming that the participant has made con- 
tributions from salary, increasing at 5 percent annually, to TIAA since 
1 June 1968; various TIAA vintages are represented in this example and 
produce a blended investment return of  6.9 percent. For CREF, the as- 
sumed interest rate is 4 percent. Future payouts on a CREF annuity will 
reflect investment performance in an underlying variable-investment ac- 
count, and, if returns exceed 4 percent, payouts will increase. 
For a single-life annuity issued to a sixty-five-year-old, TIAA is paying, 
as of 1 June 1998, an initial monthly payout of $759 per $100,000 accumu- 
lation under the standard payment method. This value is higher than the 
average commercial market  payout  for men  ($732 in  nonqualified ac- 
counts) and even more dramatically greater than that for women ($662). 
For a joint-and-survivor  annuity issued to a couple, both of  whom are 
sixty-five years old, TIAA is paying $670 monthly per $100,000, higher 
Table 5.7  Initial Monthly Payments ($) per $100,000 Accumulation from TIAA 
and CREF Annuities Issued in June 1998 
Single-Life Annuity  Joint-and-Survivor Annuity 
Age  TIAA Standard  CREF  TIAA Standard  CREF 
55  665  489  612  435 
60  704  534  636  465 
65  759  597  670  507 
70  838  683  719  566 
75  953  807  192  648 
Note; Issuance of annuity on 1 June 1998. The joint-and-survivor annuity rates quoted here 
are for benefits to a survivor the same age as the annuitant. TIAA rates reflect 30 years of 
participation (1 June 1968-1  June 1998) in TIAA and past salary growth of 5 percent per 
year; TIAA vintages are recognized. All annuity rates are unisex. There are no guaranteed 
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than the payout rate for TSP annuities. With a 4 percent assumed interest 
rate, CREF is initially paying on any of its accounts $597 monthly for the 
single-life annuity and $507 monthly for the joint-life annuity. 
Comparing the TSP (table 5.4 above) and TIAA (table 5.7), we  note 
that TIAA offers superior rates on joint-and-survivor annuities at all ages 
except the oldest and higher rates on single-life annuities at the younger 
ages. These generally higher rates result from TIAA's  superior investment 
performance. Comparisons between the TSP and TIAA should be made 
cautiously as payouts from TIAA may fluctuate somewhat, either down- 
ward or, as has occurred in the last several years, upward. Moreover, as 
noted above, with current market interest rates significantly below the 7 
percent  assumption  of  the tabular  annuity rates, the TSP offers higher 
rates than it would if its annuity rates were set precisely like TlAA's.  In 
addition, where mortality is a more important consideration, for example, 
in single-life annuities issued at older ages, the mandated use of a liberal, 
that is, old and outdated, mortality table by the TSP will lead to higher 
annuity-income rates. It is impossible to compare the increasing-payment 
TSP annuity with a CREF annuity because the assumed interest rate is 
fixed at 4 percent for CREF  while it is (implicitly) constantly changing for 
the TSF?  In June  1998, the  (implicit) TSP assumed interest rate for its 
increasing-payment annuity was 2.625 percent (= 5.625 percent -  3 per- 
cent). 
About 16,300 TIAA-CREF participants converted some or all of  their 
accumulations into streams of periodic income in 1997. Of these, 11,700 
chose a life annuity, 2,200 the MDO, 1,500 the IPRO, and 900 systematic 
withdrawals. The MDO is particularly popular among participants age 
seventy and a half and older; nearly three-quarters of this age group chose 
this form of income stream in 1997. This opting for flexibility represents 
an expected movement away  from life annuities since 1988, when a life 
annuity was the only distribution form available. Settlements into life an- 
nuities are occurring at older ages, and partial settlements into life annui- 
ties are becoming more common,  as participants choose to keep their 
options open longer. The graded-benefit payment method for TIAA tradi- 
tional  annuity  accumulations has also grown  more popular: Almost  a 
quarter of new TIM  annuitants now select this method, compared to 2 
percent when it was first introduced in 1982. 
King (1 996) looked at the choices in 1994 of TIAA-CREF participants 
among the life-annuity payout options. About three-quarters of male pri- 
mary annuitants chose the two-life annuity, while about two-thirds of fe- 
male primary annuitants chose the single-life annuity. About a third of the 
male and female annuitants choosing the single-life annuity selected no 
guaranteed period; the rest chose fairly evenly among ten-, fifteen-, and 
twenty-year guaranteed periods. Nearly all annuitants choosing a two-life 
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annuity group predominantly  selected the full-benefit-to-survivor form. 
Female annuitants in this group also favored the full benefit to survivor 
but  were  more  likely  than  men  to  select  the  half-benefit-to-second- 
annuitant form. Among payout sources, the majority of annuity payouts 
in  1994 came from TIAA, but a sizable minority of payouts were from a 
CREF variable annuity. More recently, there has been a trend toward pay- 
outs from the variable accounts. This may provide some guidance for the 
design of annuitization systems within other individual account structures. 
In particular, it suggests a substantial demand for variable as opposed to 
fixed annuities. 
5.4  Conclusions and Future Directions 
The results in this paper provide information on the costs of obtaining 
an individual annuity in three  different market environments. The first 
environment, the current market for single-premium individual annuities, 
is one in which each annuity buyer has full discretion in choosing among 
different insurance carriers and no economies of scale occur through par- 
ticipation in a group retirement-saving program. The costs in this environ- 
ment are higher than those in the other two settings that we  consider, 
namely, the federal government’s TSP and the TIAA-CREF retirement 
system that is  available to college and university employees. This is  re- 
flected in the higher average annuity payouts offered in these systems, for 
a given premium, than in the market at large. We  show that the annuity 
payouts available to TSP participants in June 1998 were roughly 4 percent 
greater than those available (on average) in the private market. It is diffi- 
cult to make a precise comparison between the annuity payouts of TIAA- 
CREF, the private market, and the TSP because of differences between 
nonguaranteed-element, variable, and nonparticipating annuity products. 
However, the TIAA-CREF payouts appear to be greater than those of the 
TSP or (on average) the private market. 
Our results provide some potential guidance on the costs of annuitiza- 
tion but also raise questions. One concerns the time-series pattern of annu- 
ity payouts relative to the premiums for single-premium annuity policies. 
Comparing the calculations in Friedman and Warshawsky (1  990), Mitch- 
ell et al. (1999), and the present paper suggests that the EPDV of annuity 
payouts has been rising, relative to premiums, for the last decade. Ex- 
plaining this trend is an important issue for further investigation. It may 
result from declining risk perceived by the insurance companies that offer 
these products, particularly with respect to interest-rate fluctuations. It 
could also reflect a failure to take into account ongoing improvements in 
mortality. For example, consider what would happen if annuity providers 
were to use information from a given past year (say, 1983, the date of the 
last major release of annuitant mortality rates by the Society of Actuaries) Costs of Annuitizing Retirement Payouts from Individual Accounts  199 
on the mortality rates of annuitants. If actual mortality rates are declining, 
then the EPDV of payouts will be rising. While this explanation is consis- 
tent with what we observe in the annuity market, we are not aware of any 
way to distinguish this possibility from alternative explanations. 
A second question concerns the design of a menu of annuity options 
that might be available for potential annuitants. Experience with TIAA- 
CREF suggests that a substantial number of participants are interested in 
variable as opposed to fixed annuities. While TSP participants can choose 
annuities that are partially inflation indexed, relatively few  do; the TSP 
experience, however, does not provide any evidence on whether annuitants 
would choose real (fully indexed), partially indexed, or nominal annuities 
if they could make such a decision. Further work should investigate the 
behavior of  individual annuitants in settings in which they can choose 
among different potential annuity options. 
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Comment  David M. Cutler 
Jim Poterba and Mark Warshawsky have written a very interesting paper 
on the cost of annuities in a privatized social security system. Low-cost 
annuitization is a central benefit of public social security, and many fear 
that annuity contracts in  a privatized  system will  be too expensive for 
people to purchase. Poterba and Warshawsky analyze this claim. 
Poterba and Warshawsky conclude that the costs of annuitization are 
quite modest. For a sixty-five-year-old male, the average individual annu- 
ity returned 85 percent of the money paid in. Groups annuities, as with 
the federal government’s Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) or TIAA-CREF, re- 
turn even more. Further, most of the 15 percent loading cost is accounted 
for by  adverse selection-differences  between the mortality  of annuity 
purchasers and that of the average person in the population. Only a small 
amount of the money paid for an annuity-perhaps  one-third of the  15 
percent load, or 5 percent-represents  true administrative expense. Since 
mandatory annuitization would eliminate the adverse-selection premium, 
Poterba and Warshawsky argue that incomplete annuitization would not 
be a significant problem in a privatized social security system. 
This paper has many strengths. The questions asked are important. The 
discussion of the annuitization options in the TSP and TIAA-CREF is 
valuable. 
In my  comments, I highlight two features of the Poterba-Warshawsky 
analysis that trouble me. The first concerns the adjustment for risk in cal- 
culating the administrative expenses of annuities. Poterba and Warshaw- 
sky take as their base case that individuals discount annuity returns at the 
tax-free return. This scenario yields the total administrative load of  15 
percent. They then present a calculation of administrative expenses if indi- 
viduals discount annuity returns at the BAA discount rate. The adminis- 
trative costs are much larger in this case-20-25  percent. The difference 
between these rates, Poterba and Warshawsky argue, has to do with indi- 
vidual attitudes toward risk. If individuals are risk averse, they argue, the 
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riskless interest rate is a more appropriate discount rate, and, hence, the 
lower estimate of administrative expense is appropriate. 
I am not convinced by this argument. Annuity companies are providing 
two services to people. First, they are investing money that individuals 
give them for future income. Second, they are converting this investment 
income into an annuity payment. The administrative costs of the second 
activity (the annuitization of  income) should be  based  on the expected 
returns that the annuity company will earn by investing the money. Individ- 
ual discount rates are not relevant to this problem. Individual discount 
rates matter for whether the policy offered is worth it but not for how 
much it costs on an actuarial basis. Put another way, administrative costs 
are a technological parameter about firms, not a preference parameter 
about individuals. 
I suspect that annuity companies believe that their return will  be even 
greater than the risky  scenario that Poterba and Warshawsky consider. 
The stock market, for example, has consistently outperformed even the 
return to BAA bonds. If annuity companies expect to earn the stock mar- 
ket return on the funds that they collect, the implicit administrative ex- 
pense will be even larger. It would be valuable for Poterba and Warshaw- 
sky  to present  administrative-cost calculations using the  stock market 
return as the discount rate. 
To  determine which rate is  correct, one would need to know the ex- 
pected return of annuity companies. With their contacts in the industry, 
Poterba and Warshawsky are in an ideal position to answer this question. 
I hope that this will be the next phase of their research. 
One other point about the analysis deserves mention. Poterba and War- 
shawsky argue that, if  annuitization is compelled, the adverse-selection 
premium will disappear. That statement is true on average, but it is not 
true for all products and all people. Even if people are compelled to annui- 
tize, they may not be compelled to purchase annuities from the same com- 
panies, or companies might not be compelled to sell to everyone. One 
might imagine that some annuity companies will  attract sick people and 
others healthy people (e.g., companies might attract sick people by offer- 
ing bereavement services or good advice about oncologists). Adverse se- 
lection will thus still be a problem; some will pay more and others less for 
the same policy. I suspect that this will be a public policy concern. 
At the end of the day, I am more skeptical about fair annuities than are 
Poterba and Warshawsky. I find support for this view in the low level of 
current annuity purchases. The inability of  annuity companies to make 
much headway in today’s market suggests that people perceive the cost of 
annuities to be greater than Poterba and Warshawsky measure them to be. 
I  suspect  that,  correctly measured,  the  administrative costs  are much 
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Discussion Summary 
Before the  general discussion, James Poterba offered several comments 
responding to David Cutler’s discussion of the paper. Poterba argued that 
it is a complicated matter to determine the correct discount rate to use in 
the expected present discounted value (EPDV) calculation. The risk-free 
rate is appropriate in that the annuity is essentially a riskless contract on 
the part of the annuitant (except for a very low  risk  that the insurance 
company will default). A riskier rate may be appropriate if the intention 
is to compare the annuity to the investor’s next-best alternative in the mar- 
ket. A riskier rate may also be appropriate if the calculation is considered 
from the supply side: discounting should be done according to the risk- 
adjusted  return that the insurance company can earn on the assets in 
which it invests. Poterba agreed that using a higher discount rate would 
imply a higher cost to the insurance company. 
Cutler had also taken issue with Poterba and Warshawsky’s assertion 
that adverse selection would be less of  a problem in an environment of 
mandatory annuitization of social security individual accounts. Cutler ar- 
gued that adverse selection would be eliminated only if  every annuitant 
were required to purchase his or her annuity from the same provider. Oth- 
erwise, differentiation among providers would lead to adverse selection. 
Poterba responded that, although this is true with respect to individual 
providers, adverse selection would not be an issue in the aggregate, that is, 
with respect to average costs across the whole population. He also men- 
tioned that variation in mortality  rates across income levels may create 
additional issues. Since lower-income individuals (with smaller accounts) 
will generally yield higher expected profit to the insurance company than 
higher-income individuals (with larger accounts), there will be differences 
between the mortality profile of the average dollar entering the system and 
the average individual entering the system. Estelle James inquired whether 
any insurance companies charge higher fees for larger accounts given the 
generally lower mortality rates of higher-income individuals. Poterba re- 
sponded that, in fact, the opposite tended to happen-and  he suggested 
that perhaps this was due to fixed costs of administering accounts. 
Martin Feldstein began the general discussion by  asking Mark War- 
shawsky if  TIAA-CREF investors’ choice of annuity-payout options had 
exhibited significant self-selection with respect to mortality-for  example, 
the mortality experience of individuals choosing more accelerated payout 
options tending to be disproportionately high, and vice versa. Warshawsky 
replied that the data were not yet available to answer this question. In 
response to a follow-up question by Feldstein, Warshawsky noted that the 
TIAA mortality tables reflect slightly lower mortality than those used by 
CREE (Annuity payments from TIAA are generally more  accelerated 
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file of individuals choosing each option should be a major area of research 
for TIAA-CREF in order to determine the likely costs of adverse selection 
as they offer more annuity options. Feldstein commented that, if  the cost 
were significant, TIAA-CREF would probably have recognized it already. 
Andrew  Samwick  suggested  that  the  Social Security Administration 
(SSA) would likely be able to handle the annuitization of individual ac- 
counts effectively.  He noted that the SSA is  very efficient at dispersing 
funds and determining when people have died and adjusting their payouts 
accordingly, essential skills for acting as a centralized clearinghouse for 
annuity payments. 
Peter Diamond suggested that data from the Poterba and Warshawsky 
paper could be used to compare government versus private management 
of individual accounts. Specifically, the Poterba and Warshawsky paper 
notes that, in June 1998, a single-premium-immediate  annuity (SPIA) pur- 
chased by  a sixty-five-year-old through the federal Thrift Savings Plan 
(TSP) would have provided $763 monthly per  $100,000 premium. The 
comparable  figure  for  a  qualified  SPIA  issued  by  Metropolitan  Life 
through an agent was $664. Diamond suggested that, given an assumption 
regarding average life span after date of annuity purchase, this $99 differ- 
ence could be converted into a basis-point figure. 
Diamond also cautioned that there may be deadweight losses and cor- 
ruption issues involved with mandatory annuitization if individuals desire 
to withdraw some of their individual account in a lump sum at retirement 
and are willing to use kickbacks in order to do so. He noted that there is 
some evidence of this type of activity occurring in Chile, where annuities 
are expensive and often include up-front commissions, part of which are 
alleged to be kicked back to the annuitant. He commented that, although 
certain regulations discouraging such activity would likely accompany an 
individual account plan with mandatory annuitization, it may remain an 
issue. 
David  Wilcox inquired about the extent of the link between mortality 
and income level. James Poterba replied that the main difference occurred 
between the bottom income quintile (with income referring to social se- 
curity  covered  earnings)  of  the  population  and  everyone  else,  with 
sixty-five- to seventy-five-year-old men in the bottom quintile experienc- 
ing approximately 60-80  percent higher mortality rates than sixty-five- to 
seventy-five-year-old men in the top quintile. Wilcox also commented that 
lower-income individuals tend to have sporadic labor force attachment. 
He suggested that, as a result of this fact, it would be inappropriate to use 
the social security actuary’s framework of comparing a “representative” 
steady low earner, steady average earner, and steady high earner. Such an 
analysis would not take into account the effect of sporadic labor force 
attachment on accumulation in the individual accounts and, thus, the size 
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were relevant to Gary Burtless’s (2000) finding that annuity payouts have 
varied widely over the twentieth century and suggested that the authors 
could perhaps flesh out this finding a bit more.  Warshawsky replied that 
he had performed a similar analysis beginning with the year 1919 and had 
also found significant variation in payout-which  he attributed largely to 
interest-rate fluctuation. Poterba added that it would not be surprising to 
observe large variations in payouts in the late 1930s and early 1940s as 
insurance companies who had misforecast interest rates and used outdated 
mortality  tables in the early  1930s adjusted for their enormous annuity 
losses in part by hiking annuity premiums. 
James Smalhout asked the authors why they had chosen to use the SSA’s 
life tables to project mortality rates rather than Census Bureau tables and 
inquired about the sensitivity of the results to that choice. Smalhout noted 
that the Census Bureau, for example, had developed its own life tables in 
part because of dissatisfaction with the SSA tables. Poterba replied that, 
in his and Warshawsky’s review  of  various mortality  data sources, they 
had found the SSA tables to be the most attractive, citing the fact that, 
since the SSA must closely monitor mortality in the older population in 
order to avoid paying benefits to deceased individuals, they tend to have 
much more accurate data than other sources. Stephen Zeldes commented 
that the accuracy of the SSA’s historic data did not necessarily imply that 
their projected data would be similarly accurate. Poterba agreed, noting 
that he and Warshawsky had not attempted directly to compare the qual- 
ity of forecasting among the various sources of mortality data. In response 
to Smalhout’s second question, Poterba commented that the results are 
certainly sensitive to the mortality data. 
Kent Smetters offered a comment regarding the relevant discount rate 
for calculating the  EPDV  of  annuity payments. He noted  that  several 
states maintain funds that guarantee the solvency of life insurance policies 
and asked whether similar funds existed for guaranteeing annuities. He 
suggested that, if these funds were to exist, then annuity providers would 
take on the risk profile of a limited-liability corporation. 
Daniel Feenberg suggested that, as a point of reference for assessing the 
value of an annuity, one could consider the consumer’s decision to pur- 
chase an annuity instead of  a corporate bond or CD. In purchasing a 
bond, the consumer would give up the “survival premium” of an annuity 
(i.e., the longer one lives, the higher the return from the annuity) but would 
gain the ability to bequeath the remaining principal and interest payments. 
He suggested that, if the bond had a higher interest rate, it would strictly 
dominate the annuity as an investment and that, if it did not have a higher 
interest rate, the value comparison would involve assessing the trade-off 
between survival premium and ability to bequeath the investment. James 
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annuities come out ahead of government bonds (which would be the rele- 
vant instrument of comparison for the Poterba and Warshawsky analysis) 
but that the comparison with corporate bonds is  a closer call. He also 
noted that annuities may not have been so attractive ten years ago but that 
the expected present value of annuity payments had  clearly risen over 
time. 
On a separate issue, Poterba pointed out that  the insurance value of 
annuities is empirically nontrivial. In the absence of a defined-benefit re- 
tirement plan such as social security, a sixty-five-year-old man would typi- 
cally be willing to give up 20-30  percent of his wealth in order to purchase 
a guaranteed stream of income for the duration of his life. Poterba noted 
that the figure would be slightly lower if  the individual had a portion of 
his assets in a social security-type  system. 
Sylvester Schieber echoed David Wilcox’s  earlier statement regarding 
the  effect of  sporadic workforce attachment, suggesting that  the  same 
effect would occur in social security. Specifically, Schieber asserted that 
the result of sporadic labor force attachment would be to make the average 
AIME (average indexed monthly earnings) lower than the AIME of the 
social security actuary’s steady average earner. He also noted  that the 
effect on social security benefits would likely be  less than the effect on 
individual account returns owing to social security’s progressive benefit 
formula. Regarding Gary Burtless’s finding of substantial volatility in an- 
nuity payouts in the twentieth century, Schieber commented that this effect 
is overstated because Burtless looks only at stock funds (i.e., the under- 
lying funds with which the annuity was purchased had been invested only 
in stocks throughout the individual’s lifetime). Schieber performed a simi- 
lar analysis based on accounts whose asset mixture was similar to that of 
a typical 401(k) account and found the volatility in annuity payouts to be 
significantly less than Burtless’s estimate. 
Estelle James noted that the high expected present value of annuity pay- 
ments per dollar of  premium seemed to suggest that individuals do not 
place high value on the insurance aspect of annuities. Assuming that indi- 
viduals are price takers who have good information regarding their ex- 
pected lifetime, we  might expect the payout-to-premium ratio to be lower 
if individuals were willing to pay more for a guaranteed stream of income. 
Poterba replied  that consumer behavior in the annuity market  remains 
somewhat of a quandary and implied that it is therefore difficult to offer 
a definitive answer to James’s question. He did note that the value of an- 
nuities is somewhat diminished for married couples as a result of “mor- 
tality pooling”-that  is, the ability to allocate assets within the family to 
hedge against risk to the survivor-and  that this effect would lead married 
individuals to value the insurance aspect of the annuity less than unmar- 
ried people. 206  James M. Poterba and Mark J. Warshawsky 
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